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The aim of this study is to provide an empirical methodology for the estimation of 
market power of individual banks. The new method employs the well-known model 
of Panzar and Rosse (1987) and proposes its estimation using the local regression 
technique. Thus, a number of restrictive assumptions regarding the properties of the 
production function of banks are relaxed, while the method proves successful in 
providing reasonable estimates of bank-level market power when applied to a large 
panel of banks of transition countries. The empirical results suggest that many banks 
in the sample deviate significantly from competitive practices and that market power 
varies substantially across banks in each country. Country averages of the bank-level 
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Evaluating competition at the industry level is a standard preoccupation of 
industrial organization in general and a central concern of banking research in 
particular. Accordingly, several studies have assessed the level of competition in 
banking markets at different levels of aggregation (for a recent review of this 
literature, see Delis et al., 2008). In many circumstances, however, the researcher may 
be interested in obtaining bank-level measures of market power, so as to address 
questions regarding the potential relationship of market power with certain elements 
of the behavior of banks, the structure of the industry and the macroeconomic 
environment. Most of these studies either employ concentration as a measure of 
competition or estimate industry-level measures of competition. Only few studies 
construct Lerner indices (e.g. Jimenez et al., 2007) or Tobin’s q (e.g. Keeley, 1990) to 
measure the market power of individual banks. Yet, use of Lerner indices entails the 
rather restrictive assumption of a constant marginal cost for the banking industry or 
for classes of banks, which is then used to calculate bank-specific price-cost margins. 
Furthermore, estimation of the marginal cost requires further assumptions regarding 
the functional form of the underlying production relationship. Tobin’s q, even though 
quite useful as a proxy for market power, requires information on the market value of 
assets, which may not be generally available, and additionally it does not originate 
from standard industrial organization theory.  
In an effort to make some progress with the estimation of bank-level market 
power using widely available sources of bank data, this paper combines two well-
established theoretical and econometric frameworks. In particular, it utilizes the well-
known model of Panzar and Rosse (PR hereafter) (1987) and proposes its estimation 
with the local regression (LR) method, as put forth by Cleveland and Devlin (1988). 
LR has been widely used in econometrics, and in the context of the present analysis it 
has the great advantage of producing observation-specific coefficients, thus dispelling 
concerns about the degrees of freedom. In addition, the restrictive assumption of a 
global parametric functional form (such as the Cobb-Douglas, translog or Fourier) 
that is needed to estimate marginal cost is avoided and, hence, the model is robust to 
such potential misspecification. Finally, since the parameters are localized at each 
observation, flexibility of the functional form is not an issue and the use of a general 
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bank-specific through localization (see Kumbhakar et al., 2007).  
This technique may be particularly valuable in exploring theoretical 
relationships in banking that require data on the market power of individual 
institutions. For example, studies exploring the relationship between competition and 
(i) the risk-taking behavior of banks (e.g. Boyd et al., 2006), (ii) regulation (e.g. 
Brissimis et al., 2008), (iii) the interest rate margins (e.g. Maudos and de Guevara, 
2004), (iv) privatizations or M&As (e.g. Gugler and Siebert, 2007), (v) other 
industries’ structure (e.g. Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006) and/or (vi) financial crises (e.g. 
Boyd et al., 2004) may benefit from the suggested approach. This is mainly because 
the number of observations will be considerably increased and, therefore, single-
country studies are possible, while a number of concerns regarding distributional 
assumptions of the underlying production relationships are addressed. It is noteworthy 
that similar local regression techniques with more or less the same advantages over 
their parametric equivalents have been recently employed to measure bank efficiency 
(see Kumbhakar et al., 2007). 
We opt for an application of the new method to a large panel of banks 
operating in 20 transition countries over the period 1999-2006. This choice is 
motivated by the existence of a recent body of literature that offers good priors 
regarding the competitive conditions in the banking sectors of these countries (see e.g. 
Delis, 2008; Brissimis et al., 2008; Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007), as well as by the 
rapid institutional changes that characterized them and may yield differences in 
market power at an inter- and/or intra-country level. 
The rest of the paper is organized along the following lines. Section 2 
comments on the theoretical background and presents the estimation method. Section 
3 discusses the estimation results, and Section 4 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Background and empirical methodology 
Recent studies that evaluate competitive conditions in the banking industry 
employ the so-called non-structural approaches, which have emerged under the 
impulse of the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) literature. These 
approaches, pioneered by Iwata (1974) and strongly enhanced by Appelbaum (1982), 
 6Bresnahan (1982, 1989), Lau (1982), Panzar and Rosse (1987) and Roeger (1995), 
test for the presence of market power by analyzing deviations from competitive 
pricing (marginal cost pricing). Their major advantage is formal grounding on explicit 
optimization models and equilibrium conditions and, as in every empirical 
framework, each of them has its advantages and disadvantages.
1  
The Panzar and Rosse (PR) model
2 relies on the premise that banks will 
employ different pricing strategies in response to a change in input costs. In other 
words, market power is measured by the extent to which changes in factor prices are 
reflected in revenue. PR define a measure of competition, the ‘H-statistic’, which 
represents the percentage change of the equilibrium revenue resulting from an 
infinitesimal percent increase in the price of all factors used by the firm, i.e. the sum 
of the input price elasticities. Owing to its relative simplicity, this methodology has 
been extensively applied to the banking sector, both in regional and single-country 
studies (see e.g. Molyneux et al., 1994; De Bandt and Davis, 2000; Bikker and Haaf, 
2002; Claessens and Laveven, 2004, 2005).   
Panzar and Rosse assert that the H-statistic is negative when the market 
structure is a monopoly, a perfectly colluding oligopoly, or a conjectural variations 
short-run oligopoly; an increase in input prices will increase marginal costs, reduce 
equilibrium output, and subsequently reduce revenue.
3 Under perfect competition, 
where banks’ products are regarded as perfect substitutes, the Chamberlinian model, 
based on free entry of banks and determining not only the output level but also the 
equilibrium number of banks, produces the perfectly competitive solution as demand 
elasticity approaches infinity. In this case, the H-statistic is equal to unity. Shaffer 
(1982) shows that the H-statistic is also unity for a natural monopoly operating in a 
perfectly contestable market and for a sales-maximizing firm that is subject to break-
even constraints. Consequently, an increase in input prices raises both marginal and 
average costs without altering the optimal output of a bank. Exit from the market will 
                                                 
1 For a review of the advantages and disadvantages of the approaches followed in these studies, see 
Shaffer (2004a). 
2 Note that this paper has its origins in Rosse and Panzar’s (1977) work.  
3 In the case where the monopolist faces a demand curve of constant price elasticity e>1 and where a 
constant returns to scale Cobb–Douglas technology is employed, PR proved that the H-statistic is equal to 
e-1. Hence, apart from the sign, the magnitude of the H-statistic may also be of importance, as the H-
statistic yields an estimate of the Lerner index of monopoly power L = (e-1)/e = H/(H+1) (Bikker and 
Haaf, 2002; Shaffer, 1983). It should be noted, however, that Shaffer (2004b), among others, is somewhat 
skeptical about how robustly the H-statistic maps into a range of oligopoly solutions.   
 7evenly increase the demand faced by each of the remaining banks, thereby leading to 
an increase in prices and total revenue by the same amount as the rise in costs (i.e. 
demand is perfectly elastic). Finally, if the H-statistic is between zero (inclusive) and 
unity (exclusive), the market structure is characterized by monopolistic competition. 
Under monopolistic competition, potential entry leads to contestable market 
equilibrium, and income increases less than proportionally to input prices, as the 
demand for banking products that individual banks face is inelastic.  
The PR model is a valuable tool in assessing market conditions, mainly owing 
to its simplicity and transparency, while it does not lack efficiency. Moreover, data 
availability becomes much less of a constraint, since revenue is more likely to be 
observable compared to output prices (needed by the other NEIO methods). Also, by 
utilizing bank-level data, this approach allows for bank-specific differences in the 
production function. In addition, the non-necessity to define the location of the market 
a priori implies that the potential bias caused by the misspecification of market 
boundaries is avoided; hence for a bank that operates in more than one market, the H-
statistic will reflect the average of the bank’s conduct in each market. 
The H-statistic is derived using the following specification of the reduced-
form revenue equation for a panel dataset: 
01 1 , 2 2 , 3 3 , 4 5 ln ln ln ln ln ln it it it it it t it r t raaw aw aw abam ε =+ + + + + +   (1) 
where it is the subscript indicating bank i at time t, rtr is a bank’s real total revenue, 
w1, w2 and w3 are the three input prices, b stands for other bank-specific characteristics 
and  m stands for a number of country-specific control variables, the latter being 
included to capture differences of bank revenue owing to structural characteristics of 
the banking industry or different macroeconomic conditions in cross-country studies.  
Estimation of Eq. (1) using conventional econometric techniques and bank-
level data has been carried out in a number of studies (for a recent review, see Delis et 
al., 2008). The results obtained describe the competitive conditions that characterize 
the banking industry (or industries) examined. What remains as a challenge is to 
provide estimates of market power at the individual bank level. To conduct such an 
analysis, this paper draws on a non-parametric estimation technique, the local 
 8regression (LR) method, as put forth by Cleveland and Devlin (1988).
4 LR estimation 
is a consistent way to allow for nonparametric effects within the parametric model, 
and this is accomplished as follows. The underlying model for local regression is 
() ii Yx i µ ε =+ , where x are predictor variables and Y is the response variable. The 
unknown function µ(x) is assumed to be smooth and is estimated by fitting a 
polynomial model (a quadratic in our case, as in most of the literature) within a 
sliding window. Differently phrased, no strong assumptions are made about µ 
globally, but locally around x we assume that µ can be well approximated. For a 
fitting point x, define a bandwidth h that controls the smoothness of the fit and a 
smoothing window (x-h(x),  x+h(x)). To estimate µ, only observations within this 
sliding window are used. Therefore, for each fitting point a locally weighted least 
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5, 6 In terms of the PR model given by Eq. (1), the above discussion implies that we 
can obtain n estimates of each of the coefficients, naturally corresponding to each of 
the banks in the sample. Then, the H-statistic is calculated for each bank i from the 
equation  .    12 iii Haaa =++ 3 i
                                                
Estimation of Eq. (1) using the aforementioned technique presents some 
considerable advantages, besides the obvious one of deriving observation-specific 
estimates through localization. First, no assumption regarding the functional form of 
 
4 For a thorough discussion of local regression, see Loader (1999). 
5 This discussion relates to the bivariate local regression. The multivariate local regression simply adds 
further terms to the right hand-side of the formula for Y. Estimations are carried out using the program 
Locfit. 
6 An important issue in the implementation of LR is the choice of an optimal bandwidth. Many 
alternatives have been proposed, like plug-in methods and cross-validation (see Kumbhakar et al., 
2007). Here we used the generalized cross-validation method (see Loader, 1999), which in our case 
yields a bandwidth equal to 0.612.  
 9the underlying production relationship is needed, and it is well-known that it is quite 
difficult for the researcher to be certain that the “correct” functional form has been 
chosen. Second, and given this qualification, economic hypotheses are not rejected 
simply because an “improper” functional form has been chosen. Third, localization 
implies that, besides obtaining bank-level H-statistics, bank-level elasticities of 
revenue with respect to input prices and structural and macroeconomic conditions are 
also obtained, which may be quite useful information for managers and policy-
makers. For the above and possibly other reasons, a very recent literature has 
employed similar non-parametric techniques to measure bank efficiency (see e.g. 
Kumbhakar et al., 2007). 
It should be noted, however, that estimation of the PR model using a non-
parametric technique may also have some drawbacks. First, it is well-known that non-
parametric techniques have to be applied to larger datasets to avoid the so-called 
“curse of dimensionality”. Luckily, this is not an issue for micro-level studies, where 
datasets are quite large. Second, the PR model should be estimated on observations 
that are in long-run equilibrium. To test for equilibrium, one can calculate another H-
statistic (Hn) using the rate of return (return on assets), instead of total revenue, as the 
dependent variable in the regression equation.
7 In this framework, Hn=0 indicates that 
banking systems are in equilibrium. In the present analysis, testing for long-run 
equilibrium for every single observation separately is not feasible because one need to 
identify whether all observations one by one are in equilibrium. However, prior to 
estimation of the model using LR, long-run equilibrium has been examined at the 
industry level using exactly the same methodology as in previous studies (e.g. 
Claessens and Laeven, 2004). The results (not reported but available on request) 





                                                 
7 The empirical test for equilibrium is justified on the grounds that competitive capital markets will 
equalize the risk-adjusted rate of return across banks, so that (in equilibrium) the rate of return should 
not be statistically correlated with input prices. 
8 This is the Estonian banking system (p-value of the test for the Hn=0 is equal to 0.000) and thus the 
results for the H-statistic for Estonian banks may have to be treated with caution. Exclusion of Estonia 
from the LR regressions does not affect the results for the rest of the banks.  
 103. Estimation results 
As discussed above, the dataset of the present study consists of bank- and 
country-level variables. All bank-level data are obtained from BankScope and include 
2768 observations from 465 commercial banks (unbalanced panel) operating in the 20 
transition countries reported in Table 1 for the period 1999-2006.
9 Some banks were 
excluded from the empirical analysis on account of their unreasonably high/low input 
price data or because some of the required data were missing. Following standard 
practice in banking industry studies, input prices are calculated by dividing interest 
expenses by total deposits (w1), depreciation and other capital expenses by fixed 
assets (w2) and personnel expenses by total assets (w3).
10 The bank-specific variables, 
b, include the ratio of equity to total assets (ea) and the ratio of loans to total assets 
(la).
11 Finally, the country-specific control variables, m, include the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) index of banking sector reform (ebrd), 
a 3-bank concentration ratio (conc3), the asset share of majority state- and foreign-
owned banks (denoted by state and foreign, respectively), the inflation rate (inf) and 
GDP per capita (gdpcap). Table 1 provides a formal definition, the sources and 
average values (on a country-specific basis) for all the variables included in Eq. (1). 
Estimation of Eq. (1) using LR is carried out twice (corresponding to Models 1 
and 2 below, respectively), the first time controlling only for ea and la and the second 
time using the full set of control variables.
12 Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of the 
estimated H-statistic for the full sample and for Models 1 and 2, along with the 
distribution of the associated disturbances. In addition, more detailed country-specific 
average results for all the coefficients and the H-statistic are provided in Tables 2 and 
                                                 
9 We have decided to restrict the analysis to commercial banks only, so as to avoid comparing banks 
with different products, clientele and objectives. 
10 A better measure for the price of labor would be obtained if we divided personnel expenses by the 
number of employees; however, the latter variable is not available for many banks. 
11 Note that we avoid measuring bank size in terms of total assets because adding this measure to the 
revenue equation would make it de facto a price equation and might lead to a systematic bias in the 
estimation of the price parameters and therefore the H-statistic (see Vesala, 1995). Other bank-specific 
factors were used as additional explanatory variables to reflect e.g. differences in credit risk (measured 
by the ratio of loan loss provisions to assets). However, differences in the results were not statistically 
significant and therefore we decided to limit this analysis to the use of the ea and la variables.  
12 To capture country heterogeneity, both models include country dummies, but the results are not 
reported to save space. A number of robustness tests were carried out, including outlier analysis (i.e. 
trimming observations in the upper and lower 5 per cent of the distribution of the error term), scaling 
the nominal dependent variable by total assets (in the fashion of e.g. Claessens and Laeven, 2004) and 
inclusion or exclusion of a number of control variables (e.g. the loan loss provisions to loans ratio, the 
GDP growth rate and the short-term interest rate instead of the inflation rate). The results remained 
practically unchanged.  
 113, while country-specific distributions of the H-statistic are also illustrated in Figure 2. 
Noticeably, the noise component of both models shows small variations among banks, 
suggesting very good fit of the data. Model 2 slightly outperforms Model 1 in this 
respect, which may suggest that inclusion of country-level control variables is 
necessary.  
A first interesting result is that the country averages of the estimated 
coefficients on input prices vary widely between countries, whereas the price of labor 
tends to have a negative effect on bank revenue in many of the banking systems 
examined. This implies that many banks function with excess labor capacity, a 
situation representing an efficiency problem that is a common element of banking 
systems of transition countries (see Brissimis et al., 2008). Moreover, the control 
variables exert the expected impact on bank revenue. Specifically, ea is negatively 
related to rtr, indicating on the one hand that equity capital is an expensive form of 
financing because there is an expected rate of return embedded in what someone is 
willing to pay today for future increases in equity prices, and on the other hand that 
capital requirements in the banking systems examined keep capital levels higher than 
optimal in the period under consideration.
13 Also, la bears a positive sign on average, 
especially for relatively developed banking systems (e.g. Czech Republic, Latvia and 
Slovenia). The impact of banking sector reform (ebrd) on bank revenue is clearly 
positive, while majority state-owned banks generate on average lower revenue and 
majority foreign-owned banks higher revenue. Finally, both inflation and GDP per 
capita have a positive effect on bank revenue, possibly because inflation is associated 
with wider margins, while rising GDP per capita leads to increased lending and thus 
revenue.  
Given the considerable differences in the elasticities of input prices, the H-
statistics vary extensively on an inter- and intra-country basis. The results from Model 
1 (see column H1 in Table 2) indicate that the banking systems of most of the 
countries are characterized by monopolistic competition (H1 is between 0 and 1); 
however, banks operating in Croatia, Estonia, FYROM, Kazakhstan and Slovakia 
earn (on average) monopolistic profits (H1 is negative). Figure 2a shows that even the 
intra-country variation of market power of banks is quite significant (the distributions 
                                                 
13 This is a common result among studies examining banking systems under reform (see e.g. Brissimis 
et al., 2008).  
 12are scattered), implying that certain banks have greater either monopoly or 
monopsony power compared to other banks operating in the same country.
14 The 
average H-statistics for the countries examined are remarkably similar to the ones 
found by Delis (2008) and also conform to those derived with the Bresnahan’s (1987) 
method by Brissimis et al. (2008). This greatly enhances confidence in the suitability 
and applicability of the new procedure.  
When we incorporate the variables associated with the structural and 
macroeconomic environment, the H-statistics slightly increase on average, without 
significantly altering the findings about the competitive conditions (see Table 3). The 
results suggest that banks in Estonia, Kazakhstan, Slovakia and Slovenia are 
characterized by significant market power, as the respective H-statistics are clearly 
negative. Also, it can be noted that Model 2 generates a wider distribution of results 
(see Figure 2b), indicating a wider intra-country variation of bank market power. This 
finding, which is obviously related to the inclusion of the control variables m, may 
suggest that certain banks are able to better insulate their portfolios against structural 
and macroeconomic changes and thus earn higher rents or that certain banking 
systems have an oligopolistic core of banks with a competitive fringe.
15  
   
4. Concluding remarks 
This paper proposes a new method for measuring the market power of 
individual banks, by combining well-established econometric and theoretical 
frameworks. Specifically, the local regression principle is used to estimate the model 
of Panzar and Rosse (1987) and thus bank-level coefficients on input prices are 
obtained, which are then summed up to calculate the H-statistic. The method is 
applied to bank-level data from 20 transition countries so as to get some insight into 
the power of the new method. In particular, the choice of the sample is motivated by 
(i) the existence of a recent body of literature on industry-level competition for these 
                                                 
14 In fact, the results suggest that there is a trend toward more competitive practices in virtually all of 
the banking systems examined, as most of the observations with low values of the H-statistic are 
identified at the beginning of our sample period. This is an expected result given the regulatory reforms 
in the banking systems of the region and the increased privatization and foreign ownership. Since a 
more detailed discussion of the specific features of the banking systems examined is beyond the scope 
of the present analysis, graphs with a time dimension are not reported here, but are available on request.   
15 This may also be viewed as the failure of some bank managers to fully anticipate inflation, implying 
that above-normal revenue of some banks could be due to asymmetric information.  
 13countries that allows comparison of the results and (ii) the well-documented 
transitional characteristics of these banking systems, which are usually associated 
with considerable differences of conduct across banks. Our findings suggest that 
country averages for the H-statistic are very close to their parametric equivalents, as 
derived in recent literature, implying that the proposed methodology is a useful tool 
for future analysis of the competitive conditions of the banking industry. In addition, 
the intra-industry bank-specific estimates suggest a significant variation of market 
power estimates across banks, mainly reflecting wide differences in elasticities with 
respect to the price of loans and labor.  
Finally, note that estimation of other models of market power for a number of 
industries, such as the ones suggested by Bresnahan (1987), Roeger (1995) and Berry 
et al. (1995), is also possible using similar non-parametric techniques. In any case, 
this may be a desideratum for future research. 
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Table 1 





observations rtr w1 w2 w3 roa ea la ebrd  conc3  state  foreign inf gdpcap
Albania  11 57  12642.4                          0.030 1.048 0.011 0.016 0.126 0.315 2.41 76.81 40.69 58.00 2.38 1391.8
Armenia  15                           
                             
                             
                             
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                             
71  3260.6 0.050 1.304 0.032 0.018 0.217 0.388 2.40 62.26 0.91 50.58 2.40 895.4
Azerbaijan  21 102 4795.6 0.081 1.098 0.025 0.022 0.270 0.528 2.23 83.39 60.24 5.15 3.33 1007.1
Belarus  17 92 1195.8 0.120 1.224 0.040 0.024 0.222 0.507 1.44 77.36 66.71 11.76 78.71 1928.7
Bulgaria  26 181 824.8 0.044 1.605 0.016 0.013 0.172 0.491 3.30 53.88 14.08 73.11 5.86 1879.5
Croatia  38 235  45577.8 0.043 1.007 0.018 0.013 0.158 0.535 3.63 57.38 8.58 82.93 3.19 5336.9
Czech Rep.  24 169  167943.5 0.109 2.896 0.010 0.008 0.103 0.377 3.68 64.81 11.00 77.38 2.46 6598.8
Estonia  10 55  72537.3 0.029 4.150 0.018 0.011 0.173 0.558 3.81 98.14 0.99 97.04 3.68 5739.5
FYROM  15 84  12838.8
 
0.036 0.964 0.022 0.011 0.303 0.456 2.70 78.02 1.73 44.85 2.26 1925.5
Georgia  11 66 5431.5 0.060 0.795 0.031 0.036 0.256 0.548 2.45 67.29 0.00 39.46 7.68 678.9
Hungary  30 180  102191.4
 
0.070 4.101 0.018 0.015 0.123 0.537 4.00 62.10 7.96 74.10 6.64 5706.1
Kazakhstan  24 140 24168.7 0.190 1.437 0.022 0.026 0.205 0.541 2.75 66.40 5.55 20.98 8.15 1928.0
Latvia  24 168  20547.0 0.023 1.441 0.017 0.012 0.123 0.410 3.48 54.59 3.69 59.85 4.00 4303.7
Lithuania  9 68  35020.6
 
0.028 0.756 0.021 0.005 0.128 0.508 3.25 82.23 11.63 79.50 1.24 4032.4
Moldova  16 92 2516.3 0.059 0.764 0.032 0.039 0.260 0.496 2.45 69.85 13.63 32.14 16.83 336.8
Poland  53 289  134323.2
 
0.067 4.419 0.019 0.012 0.145 0.520 3.40 55.21 23.74 69.53 4.05 4750.3
Romania  27 180 7609.9 0.090 1.328 0.033 0.006 0.180 0.444 2.81 67.25 31.23 56.88 23.91 2112.3
Slovakia  16 112  82663.3 0.046 4.302 0.011 0.007 0.096 0.417 3.34 77.48 13.95 77.06 7.06 4104.2
Slovenia  21 129  87437.3 0.038 0.871 0.014 0.012 0.108 0.530 3.30 64.29 24.61 17.93 5.64 10474.2
Ukraine  57 298  10899.8 0.078 1.157 0.024 0.018 0.166 0.582 2.33 49.77 10.54 15.81 12.56 912.0
Total  465 2768 49504.9 0.123 2.183 0.021 0.015 0.167 0.495 3.00 63.66 17.70 50.47 9.91 3211.2
Note: The table presents descriptive statistics of the sample on a country-specific basis. The variables are as follows: rtr is real total bank revenue (in thousand euros), 
w1 is interest expenses over total deposits, w2 is overheads minus personnel expenses over fixed assets, w3 is personnel expenses over total assets, roa is total profits 
over total assets, ea is equity over total assets, la is total loans over total assets, ebrd is the index of banking sector reform, conc3 is the 3-bank concentration ratio, 
state is the asset share of majority state-owned banks, foreign is the asset share of majority foreign-owned banks, inf is the inflation rate and gdpcap is GDP per 
capita in euros. All bank-level data are obtained from BankScope. ebrd, foreign, inf and gdpcap are obtained form the EBRD’s Transition Reports and conc3 is 
obtained from the Beck et al. (2000) database as updated in 2007.  19
 
Table 2 
Average coefficients of Model 1 
Country lnw1  lnw2  lnw3  lnea  lnla  cons  H1 
Albania 0.636  0.036  -0.349  -1.685  0.475  6.385  0.324 
Armenia -0.175  0.317  0.223  -0.330  0.235  8.808  0.366 
Azerbaijan 0.115  0.296  0.261  -0.911  -0.089  8.339  0.671 
Belarus 0.404  0.287  -0.116  -0.515  -0.055  8.756  0.575 
Bulgaria 0.306  0.107  -0.408  -0.297  0.222  7.311  0.005 
Croatia 0.228  0.084  -0.447  -0.140  0.240  7.759  -0.135 
Czech Rep.  0.399  0.125 -0.214  -0.161  0.294 9.252 0.310 
Estonia 0.075  -0.301  -0.411  -0.074  0.173  7.584  -0.636 
FYROM -0.616  0.237  0.109  -0.952  -0.150  5.404  -0.270 
Georgia 0.388  0.007  -0.072  -0.390  0.026  9.072  0.323 
Hungary 0.329  0.059  -0.488  -0.194  0.099  7.793  -0.099 
Kazakhstan 0.145  -0.023  -0.777 -0.053  0.161 6.268 -0.655 
Latvia 0.476  0.039  -0.547  -0.088  0.117  8.108  -0.032 
Lithuania 0.270  0.169  -0.525  -0.227  0.156  7.360  -0.086 
Moldova 0.270  0.062  0.330  -0.486  -0.166  9.984  0.662 
Poland 0.390  0.192  0.282  -0.367  0.079  10.662  0.864 
Romania 0.747  0.076  -0.413  -0.533  -0.232  8.338  0.411 
Slovakia 0.071  0.344  -1.501  1.733  -0.128  6.371  -1.086 
Slovenia -0.015  0.175  -0.252  -0.494  0.192  7.017  -0.092 
Ukraine 0.380  -0.022  -0.265  -0.378  0.367  8.562  0.093 
Average 0.287  0.105  -0.189  -0.282  0.121  8.173  0.203 
Note: The table presents average coefficients on a country-specific basis and for the 
whole sample obtained from the estimation of Eq. (1) (excluding the structural and 
macroeconomic control variables M) using LR. The variables are as follows (ln 
represents natural logarithm): Dependent variable is rtr, the real total bank revenue, w1 
is interest expenses over total deposits, w2 is overheads minus personnel expenses 
over fixed assets, w3 is personnel expenses over total assets, ea is equity over total 
assets, la is total loans over total assets, cons is the constant term and H1 is the H-
statistic calculated as lnw1+lnw2+lnw3 for each observation in the sample. 
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Table 3 
Average coefficients of Model 2 by country 
        Country lnw1 lnw2 lnw3 lnea lnla ebrd conc3 state foreign inf gdpcap cons H2
Albania                            0.783 -0.054 0.153 -1.499 0.102 1.569 3.249 -0.311 0.022 -0.007 0.118 2.752 0.882
Armenia                           
                           
                         
                           
                         
                     
                         
                           
                         
                           
                           
                         
                           
                           
                         
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
-0.271 0.445 0.234 -0.246 0.223 0.189 0.023 -0.004 -0.007 0.041 0.153 6.473 0.408
Azerbaijan
 
0.161 0.238 0.147 -0.699 -0.138 -0.016 -0.093 -0.048 0.008 0.064 0.121 6.920 0.547
Belarus 0.220 0.079 0.117 -0.543 -0.007 -1.610 -0.320 -0.484 -0.020 0.079 0.742 13.404 0.417
Bulgaria
 
0.342 0.082 -0.210 -0.250 0.116 0.146 0.053 -0.093 0.001 0.047 0.115 5.958 0.214
Croatia 0.229 0.118 -0.287 -0.171 0.227 0.326 0.026 0.159 0.102 0.038 0.085 6.056 0.059
Czech Rep. 
 
0.365  0.092  -0.124 -0.254 0.236 0.114 0.053 0.031 -0.039 0.043 0.090 7.125 0.333
Estonia 0.144 -0.252 -0.030 -0.107 0.019 1.404 0.072 0.025 -0.019 -0.013 0.106 4.764 -0.137
FYROM
 
-0.631 0.212 0.322 -1.026 -0.251 0.636 0.113 -0.066 0.122 0.023 0.145 3.189 -0.097
Georgia 0.403 0.031 -0.266 -0.309 -0.030 -0.074 0.043 0.123 0.224 0.041 0.046 5.563 0.169
Hungary 0.341 0.033 -0.297 -0.232 -0.003 0.519 0.110 -0.089 0.099 0.038 0.114 5.294 0.078
Kazakhstan
 
0.035 -0.068 -0.465 -0.101 -0.008 -0.019 -0.032 -0.086 0.115 0.051 0.108 6.070 -0.498
Latvia 0.410 -0.001 -0.427 -0.152 0.237 0.323 -0.038 -0.008 0.056 0.019 0.107 6.552 -0.017
Lithuania 0.225 0.083 -0.213 -0.293 0.093 -0.317 -0.034 -0.049 0.013 0.054 0.110 7.485 0.096
Moldova
 
0.300 0.030 0.109 -0.382 -0.120 0.838 0.122 -0.047 -0.047 0.029 0.080 5.330 0.438
Poland 0.361 0.130 0.334 -0.387 0.016 -0.373 0.057 -0.091 0.024 0.058 0.114 9.316 0.825
Romania 0.707 0.011 -0.332 -0.540 -0.130 0.631 0.111 0.008 0.052 0.026 0.126 4.693 0.386
Slovakia 0.184 0.352 -1.172 1.364 -0.135 0.408 0.046 0.030 0.025 0.036 0.116 4.282 -0.635
Slovenia -0.183 0.173 -0.113 -0.489 0.128 0.426 0.062 -0.051 0.010 0.006 0.127 4.965 -0.123
Ukraine 0.487 0.010 -0.151 -0.305 0.216 1.136 -0.115 0.055 0.066 0.028 0.041 5.198 0.346
Average 0.279 0.083 -0.158 -0.293 0.067 0.337 0.020 -0.022 0.005 0.036 0.117 6.147 0.204
Note: The table presents average coefficients on a country-specific basis and for the whole sample obtained from the estimation of Eq. (1) 
(including the structural and macroeconomic control variables M) using LR. The variables are as follows (ln represents natural logarithm): 
Dependent variable is rtr, the real total bank revenue, w1 is interest expenses over total deposits, w2 is overheads minus personnel expenses 
over fixed assets, w3 is personnel expenses over total assets, ea is equity over total assets, la is total loans over total assets, cons is the constant 
term, ebrd is the index of banking sector reform, conc3 is the 3-bank concentration ratio, state is the asset share of majority state-owned banks, 
foreign is the asset share of majority foreign-owned banks, inf is the inflation rate, gdpcap is GDP per capita and H2 is the H-statistic 
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Figure 1: Frequency distribution of market power estimates of banks and 
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Note: The first two histograms present the distribution of the H-statistic obtained from the estimation 
of Models 1 (excludes structural and macroeconomic variables) and 2 (includes these variables) with 
local regression. The other two histograms present the distribution of the noise components generated 





























-1 -.5 0 .5 1 -1 -.5 0 .5 1 -1 -.5 0 .5 1 -1 -.5 0 .5 1 -1 -.5 0 .5 1
Albania Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus Bulgaria
Croatia Czech Republic Estonia FYROM Georgia
Hungary Kazakhstan Latvia Lithuania Moldova











Note: The histograms present on a country-specific basis the distribution of the H-statistic obtained from the estimation of Model 1 with local regression. For expositional 
brevity, a kernel density line is added to the graphs. 
 
 
  22Note: The histograms present on a country-specific basis the distribution of the H-statistic obtained from the estimation of Model 2 with local regression. For expositional 
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Figure 2b: Market power estimates of banks by country (obtained from the estimation of Model 2) 
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